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Pandora’s Ballot Box, Or A Proxy With Moxie? The Majority
Voting Amendments to Delaware Corporate Law
Jay Verret1a
“The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which
serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized
by the existence of divisible residual claims …and…which can generally be
sold without permission of the other contracting individuals.”
Michael Jensen and William Meckling
Theory of the Firm
"You own the company. That's right -- you, the stockholder. And you are all
being royally screwed over by these, these bureaucrats, with their luncheons,
their hunting and fishing trips, their corporate jets and golden parachutes."
Gordon Gekko (Played by Michael Douglas)
Annual Stockholders Meeting of Teldar Paper
The Movie Wall Street

The Delaware General Assembly has recently adopted an amendment
to the Delaware General Corporation Law which provides that where
shareholders have adopted a majority voting bylaw for corporate elections over
the traditional plurality scheme, a corporation may not subsequently amend its
bylaws to return to plurality voting without shareholder approval. I will
compare this provision to other approaches and try to explain the reasons
underlying its adoption. I will also briefly summarize the evolving shareholder
empowerment debate and analyze the majority voting provision in the context
of that discussion. I will describe some unique and unanticipated interactions
between majority voting bylaws and various other working parts of corporation
and securities law affecting the shareholder franchise, a carefully protected right
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in Delaware jurisprudence.1
The most prevalent corporate strategies
responding to this movement will be explored and the difficulties of
implementing majority voting will be described. Finally, I will analyze voting
schemes from the political sphere in an attempt to find analogous lessons for the
corporate arena. I will then end with some predictions about future
developments which will hinge on the outcome of SEC rules proposals, further
DGCL revisions, and the responses of Delaware incorporated entities.
This piece blends three distinct groups of thought: i) Theoretical
corporate law scholarship and financial regulatory theory, ii) Interpretation of
Delaware Chancery Court cases, and iii) Practical analysis on the future of the
majority voting movement and the strategic choices facing board of directors in
the aftermath of the Delaware amendments and corollary SEC and NYSE
regulatory initiatives.
I. Summary of the Statutory Changes
II. The Genesis of the Majority Voting Amendment and a Comparison
to Other Regulatory Approaches
A. Development of Withhold Vote Campaigns by Institutional Investors
and the Grey Line between Symbolic and Pyrrhic Victories
B. Case in Point: The Disney Withhold Vote Campaign; It’s is a Small
world after all, Mr. Eisner
C. Political Analysis of the Majority Voting Amendment; A Tour Inside
the Corporate Law Factory.
D. Alternative Regulatory Schemes
III. The Shareholder Power Debate, A Foucault Pendulum
A. The General Debate
B. Institutional Investors and the Collective Action Problem; Why no one
volunteers for Kitchen Patrol in Mutual Fund Families.
IV. The Shareholder Power Debate as Applied to Majority Voting
A. General Arguments
B. A First Strike Capability for Financial Intermediaries
V. Brewing a Perfect Storm---SEC proxy reform, NYSE Exchange Rule
452, and Internet Proxy Solicitation.
A. A Modest Proposal
B. Rule 452
C. Online Solicitation
D. Case in Point: The Heinz Proxy War, Would You Please Pass the
Proxy?
VI. Implementation of Majority Voting and Its Many Iterations
A. Mechanical Issues in Tallying the Voting Outcome
B. The Various Bylaw Strategies
C. The Sobering Effect of the Holdover Rule, the Staggered Board, and
Board Replacement or Resignation Rejection.
D. The Strategy of the Stalking Horse Candidate
1

See Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294, 311 (Del. Ch.
2002).
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VII. An Analysis of Voting Outcomes Using an Analogy to Political
Science
VIII. Conclusion and Predictions

I. A Summary of the Statutory Changes
An analysis of Delaware corporate law must necessarily begin with
Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) 141, “The business and
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors”.2 The DGCL
further provides that, in the absence of a bylaw to the contrary, directors
shall be elected by a plurality of the votes cast.3 Plurality voting means
that the candidates receiving the greatest number of affirmative votes
cast, limited by the number of seats up for election, is victorious in that
election. Thus it would be possible for an uncontested candidate to
receive one vote in favor, and millions of no or “withhold” votes, and
still emerge victorious in the election. Since corporate elections are not
subject to a runoff process, and shareholders are able to nominate rival
candidates for corporate elections, the plurality default was adopted in
response to the potential situation in which no nominee was able to
obtain a majority of the votes cast, thus resulting in a failed election.4
Under the DGCL, the bylaws of a corporation may contain any
provision not in conflict with the DGCL, and may be adopted by the
shareholders, or, if given the power to do so in the corporate charter, the
board of directors.5 A recent addition to section 216 and the subject of
this article, adopted in August of 2006, specifies that “A bylaw
amendment adopted by stockholders which specifies the votes that shall
be necessary for the election of directors shall not be further amended or
repealed by the board of directors.”6 This effectively means that a
shareholder approved change to the default plurality voting standard

2

8 Del.C. § 141.

3

8 Del.C. § 216 states “In the absence of such specification in the certificate of
incorporation or bylaws of the corporation: . . . (3) Directors shall be elected by a
plurality of the votes of the shares present in person or represented by proxy at the
meeting and entitled to vote on the election of directors.”

4

See American Bar Association, Committee on Corporate Laws Discussion Paper 1506
PLI/Corp 473, *506 (2005). Citing S. 93 134th Gen. Assembly, 66 Del. Laws ch. 136,
§ 11 (1987), reprinted in 2 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN,
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, §
216.
5

8 Del.C. § 109(b).

6

8 Del.C. § 216.
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cannot be unilaterally altered by the board without shareholder
ratification.
DGCL 141 also provides that “Any director or the entire board of
directors may be removed, with or without cause, by the holders of a
majority of the shares then entitled to vote at an election of directors”,
but then subjects that provision to the following exception: “(1) Unless
the certificate of incorporation otherwise provides, in the case of a
corporation whose board is classified as provided in subsection (d) of
this section, shareholders may effect such removal only for cause.”7 The
obvious result is that nearly all corporate charters will allow removal
(between elections) by a majority of shareholders only for cause, thus
requiring some alternative means for removal of a director.
Furthermore, in any event, a removed director continues to serve until a
replacement can be nominated and elected under the “holdover” rule.8
Another recent addition to the DGCL, relevant to this exploration, is
the advance resignation provision providing that “A resignation which
is conditioned upon the director failing to receive a specified vote for
reelection as a director may provide that it is irrevocable.”9 The
statutorily protected permanence of such a board policy may fall in line
with an emerging trend toward holding boards firmly to their
representations to their shareholders in Delaware courts.10
II. The Genesis of the Majority Voting Amendment and a Comparison
to Other Regulatory Approaches
A. Development of Withhold Vote Campaigns by Institutional Investors
and the Grey Line between Symbolic and Pyrrhic Victories
Former SEC Commissioner Joseph Grundfest initially proposed the
use of withhold vote campaigns in a law review article in 1993.11 At the
time, the active takeover market of the 80s was killed by a cocktail of
poison pills, antitakeover legislation, and diminished access to capital;
takeovers could no longer be used to control management excess and
7

8 Del. C. § 141 (k).

8

8 Del. C. § 141(b).

9

8 Del. C. § 141(b).

10

See, e.g., Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 2005 WL 3529317, at *5(Del. Ch. Dec. 20,
2005). Compare Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003);
Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
11

See Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with

Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1993).
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urge boards to respond to shareholder discontent.12 Proxy fights were
also of marginal utility because the institutional investors who could
lead the charge suffered from a collective action problem.13 Grundfest’s
proposal was to use withhold votes as a mechanism whereby investors
could communicate dissatisfaction with a board at low cost.14
Compared to the enormous expense of running an independent proxy
fight, investors, both institutional and otherwise, would find that a
withhold vote campaign would be more capable of sustaining
momentum.15
SEC proxy rules require that a proxy allow for withhold votes, or an
instruction to not vote for a management slate even if they are running
unopposed.16 In compliance, the proxy may include (i) a “withhold”
box next to the name of each nominee, or (ii) an instruction in bold face
type that a voter may strike through a name to vote against the
nominee, or (iii) designated blank spaces in which the voter is permitted
to enter names of nominees for which they intend to withhold a vote, or
(iv) any other similar means, provided that clear instructions are
furnished indicating how the security holder may withhold authority to
vote for any nominee.17
Many have since challenged the usefulness of withhold vote
campaigns.18 However, Grundfest urged that they would provide
institutional investors with the facility to negotiate with boards
concerned about the prospect of becoming a target.19 Grundfest
reasoned that board members taking the job out of a desire for prestige
would want to avoid the negative publicity20 surrounding a withhold
12

Id. at 934.

13

Grundfest cites three iterations of the institutional investor collective action problem:,
rational apathy where each discounts the marginal effectiveness of individually joining
the group, a game-theory type dilemma whereby each individual has an incentive to
free ride, and the difficulty of finding a homogenous result that they can all agree on
with the attendant costs of communicating among shareholders in the group. Id. at 909.
Also explored in more detail in Section III B infra.

14

Id. at 866.

15

Id. at 909.

16

SEC Rule 14-a4(b)(2); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14.

17

SEC Rule 14-a4(b)(2); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14

18

Diane Del Guercio, Laura Wallis & Tracey Woidtke, Do Board Members Pay
Attention When Institutional Investors ‘Just Say No’?, (June 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=575242).

19
20

Grundfest, supra, at 865.

That negative publicity would be facilitated by the SEC’s directive that the results of
corporate elections, including a tally of withhold votes, be publicly disclosed. 17
C.F.R. 240.14a-1 to 240.14a-7, 240.14a-10.
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vote campaign.21 A looming withhold vote would also give directors
more of an incentive and justification to challenge a domineering CEO.22
Or, in the aftermath of a withhold vote, takeover artists may smell
weakness and be more willing to run the gauntlet of a tender offer (with
its attendant proxy fight and risk of expensive litigation). He also raises
the possibility of the Chancery Court enhancing its review of a board’s
decision not to withdraw a poison pill in response to a tender on the
heels of a successful withhold vote campaign.23 Grundfest notes that, as
a signal without the necessity of legally binding effect, withhold votes
would not even need to obtain a majority vote to be useful.24
Majority voting is the true progeny of the withhold vote movement.
This is because majority voting turns a symbolic withhold vote into an
effective vote of “no” (which otherwise does not appear on the
corporate proxy). Seeing the effectiveness of withhold vote campaigns
when they were merely a symbolic gesture, institutional investors have
lately moved to make withhold votes into a more effective negotiating
tool by supporting majority voting in certain circumstances.25
B. Case in Point: The Disney Withhold Vote Campaign; It’s is a small
world after all, Mr. Eisner
Michael Eisner, former Chairman and CEO of the Walt Disney Co.,
faced a number of challenges in his final years at the helm.26 Due to
these ongoing problems, ISS recommended shareholders withhold their
votes for his unopposed election as director of Disney. A number of
large institutional investors followed suit, resulting in a 43% withhold
21

Grundfest, supra, at 927-930.

22

Id. at 930.

23

Id. at 935. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del.
1985), Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 286-92 (Del. Ch. 1989).

24

Grundfest, supra, at 913. This prediction ultimately proved to be quite prescient.
See, e.g., withhold vote campaigns at Safeway, Inc., Disney, Inc., and Home Depot.
Mentioned in Stephen Deane, Majority Voting, From the Symbolic to the Democratic,
Institutional Shareholder Services Center for Corporate Governance (2005) [hereinafter
ISS Report].

25

Former Chancellor William Allen observed that just voting no is “like chicken soup;
it couldn’t hurt, and what if it helps?” See Grundfest, supra, at 868, citing a “Private
Communication with Chancellor William T. Allen (Mar. 6, 1992).” at fn 40. Perhaps,
as we shall see, majority voting is the spice to liven the soup up a bit. However, with
corollary SEC and NYSE action, perhaps too many cooks will also spoil the broth.
26

Phyllis Furman, Joy in the Mouse House: Disney Shareholders Give Eisner Thumbs
Up, N.Y. Daily News, Feb. 12, 2005. For instance, Eisner was engaged in momentous
litigation over the hiring of Michael Ovitz and had just lost Pixar Studios over what was
arguable a personality conflict.
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vote against Eisner.27 The Board responded by forcing Eisner to step
down as Chairman, and he eventually left Disney when his contract
expired. Here, no majority voting bylaw was in effect (although Disney
has since adopted a majority voting regime for uncontested elections),
Eisner managed to receive a majority of the votes cast, and the holdover
rule would have still maintained his office until a replacement could be
elected even if the vote had legal effect. Further, he remained as CEO
for the remainder of his contract. Nevertheless, the board responded to
the outcome by replacing him as Chairman. If institutional investors
were able to convince owners of 43% of the shares cast to withhold their
votes when the result had no legal significance, then it is then
conceivable that they could have come closer to breaking the 50%
threshold when legal consequence are present.28 And if the Board of
Directors responds to a vote result with no legal significance, then it is
conceivable they would respond more strongly to one that does. This
proves that, even if later shown to be ill advised, the majority voting
amendment to the DGCL is at least not irrelevant.
C. Political Analysis of the Majority Voting Amendment; A Tour Inside
the Corporate Law Factory.
When viewed through the lens of the various academics that have
sought to explain the process of how Delaware makes corporate law,29
we can begin to understand the factors shaping the present amendment.
27

See http://www.usatoday.com/money/media/2004-03-03-disney-shareholdermeeting_x.htm.
28

Absent broker street voting, the vote would have been a majority withhold vote. See
Section V B infra.

29

See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, *1750 fn. 2, citing (“E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf
Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over
Corporate Charters, 112 Yale L.J. 553 (2002); William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663 (1974); Jill E. Fisch, The
Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 1061 (2000); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited:
Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 913 (1982); Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of
Corporate Reform, 29 J. Corp. L. 625 (2004); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock,
Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1573
(2005); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate
Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1908 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 469
(1987); Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. Corp. L.
99 (2004); Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588 (2003)
[hereinafter Roe, Delaware's Competition]; Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 Harv.
L. Rev. 2491 (2005) [hereinafter Roe, Delaware's Politics]; Roberta Romano, The State
Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 709 (1987) [hereinafter
Romano, Competition Debate]; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977).”).
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One can hardly call the Delaware response anything but conservative.
The amendment merely says that, where shareholders adopt a majority
voting bylaw, the board will not be able to unilaterally amend the
bylaw. Its corollary says that advance resignation letters conditioned on
failure to get a majority vote are binding. Shareholders’ ability to
nominate directors was not enhanced, the plurality default was not
altered. This is consistent with Hamermesh’s three-fold observation
that Delaware i) will not act in the absence of clear policy implication,
ii)favors private parties ordering their own relations, and iii)always
makes slow, conservative changes to corporate law when it is moved to
make a change at all.30 The Delaware response allows shareholders and
board to decide the election system they favor and merely makes such a
decision concrete if shareholder approved. It was based on extensive
discussion that began at the federal level and only lately provoked a
muted response at the Delaware Committee on Corporate Laws.31
Mark Roe has also explored in some depth the process by which
Delaware Corporate Law evolves and the interest groups and goals
shaping that evolution.32 In effect, he posits that in order to attract and
maintain corporate franchise fees, Delaware will respond jointly to the
interests of shareholders and management to the exclusion of other
affected groups, as the ratification of both groups is required for reincorporation into or out of Delaware.33 Thus, when the two groups can
agree, they get a quick change, and when they disagree the state will
offer a moderated proposal that balances their interest. Roe also argues
that Delaware will be spurred to act where the threat of federal action is
imminent, because once both groups have achieved a result in Delaware
they will be unmotivated to move beyond the status quo to push for
changes on the federal level, which might bring in other parties (e.g.,
Unions) who may advocate for a result that neither of them favor.34
Thus Delaware is a place to pre-empt unwieldy and unpredictable
federal reform.35 Delaware might also act to pre-empt in cases where
national scandal make federal response likely.36 Furthermore, to make
Delaware pre-emption of federal action more likely, Delaware will
moderate its action to minimize the chances of federal ire.37 Consistent
30

Hamermesh indeed uses the majority voting amendment as an example of his theory
in action. See Id. at 1773.

31

Id.

32

See generally Mark Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491 (June 5,
2005); Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (December 2003).
33

Mark Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, at 2495 (June 5, 2005).

34

Id. at 2513

35

Id. at 2516

36

Id. at 2516.
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with that thesis, Former Chief Justice Veasy of the Delaware Supreme
Court commented at an SEC roundtable discussion considering
shareholder nominations that the Delaware Corporate Law’s Committee
should consider adopting majority voting to pre-empt federal
legislation.38
In order to fully understand the Roe hypothesis in the context of the
majority voting amendment, we must also understand the interest
groups involved. For that, we need only look to the comment letters
submitted to the committee whose task it was to study the proposal.
The Council of Institutional Investors, a trade group representing large
pension funds, wrote to the committee charged with examining the
majority voting amendment to express its whole hearted support of
majority voting as a new default standard for shareholder elections.39
Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS’), a proxy advisory firm that
represents the interests of a broader group of institutional investors, also
has exhibited support for majority voting.40 The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, representing the interest of corporate management of
Delaware Corporations, felt that there was no need for a present
revision, but the businesses it represents were happy to institute board
approved (and thus board revocable) bylaws or director resignation
policies. We can then view Delaware result as a mediation between the
extremes. The default rule of plurality voting wasn’t altered, despite the
insistence of the CII and ISS, but bylaws that pass with shareholder
approval are protected from board meddling. Further, the director
advance resignations that companies were already throwing corporate
governance activists to keep the wolves at bay become permanent once
37

Id. at 2513.

38

Available at http://sec.gov/spotlight/dir-nominations/transcript03102004.txt (“And
perhaps the Commission would want to consider if you want to adopt the provision you
have on the table to create an exception for any state law that
allows…majority…voting, for example, or any organic document of a corporation like
the certificate of incorporation or bylaws be effective, to allow that, then this provision
wouldn't apply to any such situation as that. I think it would be an interesting proposal
for the Delaware legislative branch to consider through the good offices of the counsel
of the Delaware State Bar Association Corporate Law's Committee, and there are
others.”).

39

Available at http://www.cii.org/library/correspondence/061705_mcbride.htm (“I am
writing to you in your capacity as Chairman of the Corporation Law Section (the
“Section”) of the Delaware State Bar Association to request that the Section consider
recommending to the Delaware legislature an amendment to Section 216 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”), 8 Del. C. § 216, to make majority
voting for director elections the presumptive choice for Delaware corporations.”).

40

In 2007, ISS plans to include the presence and strength of a company’s majority
voting bylaw as an additional factor in the scoring systems it uses to rate the
effectiveness of the company’s corporate governance effectiveness. See
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/2007%20US%20Policy%20Update.pdf.
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received. Institutional investors and management each get a little
something, reform is measured and narrowly tailored, and let the
wheels of commerce continue to spin.
In this case, the specter of corporate ballot reform is also looming on
the federal level consistent with the Roe hypothesis. After a failed effort
at granting shareholders proxy access to the corporate ballot, the SEC is
again considering a hotly contested proposal to allow shareholders
access.41 A move to make majority voting bylaws resolute, once passed,
could be a measure to minimize institutional shareholder interest in
such a proposal.42 The present amendment doesn’t give unions the
opportunity to place divisive directors onto the ballot, something they
might achieve under a ballot access rule. But it does allow institutional
investors to send a message by voiding directors when they are
dissatisfied with their performance.43 Additionally, one can see this as
following in the scandal, seen among institutional investor advocacy
groups, of the Eisner saga. Excessive executive compensation and the
last vestiges of post-Enron outrage have given advocates of investor
democracy just enough fuel to bring this to the attention of federal
regulators. In that case, perhaps Delaware is hoping it can moderate the
eventual federal response.44 Thus Hamermesh and Roe have shown us
the raison de-etre for these amendments to the DGCL. What remains to
be seen is if they will, in their interaction with other regulatory powers,
have the effect that was originally intended.
41

TAKEOVER LAW AND PRACTICE 2006 1571 PLI/Corp 259, *380 (“See, e.g.,
Proxy Access: To Be or Not to Be? Thirteen Months after SEC Proposes Rule,
Resolution is No Closer, 17 M&A Rep. 45 (Nov. 22, 2004) (noting that proxy access
proposal received 16,000 comment letters, a record-breaking number); Judith Burns and
Siobhan Hughes, SEC Chairman Sees "Consensus" on US Market Reforms, Dow Jones
Newswires (Feb. 10, 2005) (quoting SEC Chairman William Donaldson as
acknowledging that the SEC's original proxy access proposal "doesn't fly," is "too
complicated," and that he would like to start over with "wholly new thoughts" on how
to tackle the subject).”).

42

Indeed, former Commissioner Grundfest wrote to the SEC to urge that majority
voting is a proper alternative to corporate proxy access. See ISS Report, supra, at 9.

43

ISS lists three reasons for targeting individual directors for withhold vote campaigns:
i)interlocking directorates involving key board committees ii)poor director attendance
and iii)serving on too many boards. They also cite 4 factors they use in targeting
boards overall: i)ignoring majority votes on shareholder precatory proposals ii)payment
of excessive non-audit fees iii)overlooking obvious boardroom conflicts and
iv)adoption of dead-hand poison pills. See ISS Report, supra, at iii.

44

Roe, supra, at 2529. This analysis does run the risk of a reverse-causation paradox.
Does the SEC act because of a lack of attention in the DGCL? Then does Delaware act
to pre-empt the SEC? And then does the Delaware action alter the SEC’s response?
And here, we have a Delaware amendment related to an SEC proposal that previously
failed to pass, but is subsequently being reconsidered due to a federal court ruling. In
the end, the portion of the Roe hypothesis regarding Delaware action in advance of
federal pre-emption is helpful for analyzing this policy, but shouldn’t be taken to excess
limits.
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D. Alternative Regulatory Schemes
1) The MBCA Recommendation
The American Bar Association promulgates the Model Business
Corporation Act (“MBCA”), which serves as a model corporate code
utilized by most states (except, of course, Delaware).45 Though some
groups advocated for an alteration to the plurality voting default found
in the code, the Committee opted against recommending a change from
the plurality default for three reasons: it virtually assures a successful
election of directors in every election, voting results are delivered in a
simple and transparent way, and it is a standard that fits well with the
many varying shareholder rights schemes (e.g., cumulative votes,
multiple share classes).46
However, it recommended a change to the MBCA47 that
substantially mirrors the Delaware majority voting amendments
(including facilitating a director resignation policy) with the following
caveat: operation of the holdover rule default48 could be stayed to
require a director failing to receive a majority vote in favor of their
election, in a company that adopted majority voting in its bylaws, to
step down within 90 days of the election.49 The Committee reasoned
that, absent an alteration to the holdover rule, the consequences of a
majority voting bylaw would remain largely symbolic.50 So its
recommendation would amend the MBCA to expressly permit a bylaw
to opt out of the holdover default in the sole circumstance of a director
45

McBride, PLI report at 298.

46

Preliminary report at 20.

47

As there is some overlap between the membership of the ABA Committee and the
Delaware Council on Corporate law, and both are composed in part by practicing
members of the Delaware Bar, the deliberations by each group are appropriately crossreferenced. See American Bar Association, "Preliminary Report of the Committee on
Corporate Laws on Voting by Shareholders for the Election of Directors" at 7 (Jan. 17,
2006), available at
www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL270000pub/directorvoting/20060117000001.pd
.7[hereinafter “Preliminary Report”] (“Delaware is not a Model Act State, but Delaware
lawmakers carefully study the work of Committee and Model Act Developments”).

48

The holdover rule, allowing for a director failing to win an election to stay on until a
replacement is elected and qualified, serves the purpose of ensuring that “the power of
the Board of Directors to act continues uninterrupted even though an annual
shareholder’s meeting is not held or the shareholders are deadlocked and unable to elect
directors at the meeting.” See MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN., §8.05 at 8-47 (Official
Comment).
49

See Preliminary Report, supra, at 4

50

See Id. at 16.
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elected by plurality vote but failing to achieve a majority of votes cast.
The recommendations specifically exempt private, non-traded
corporations and corporations that allow cumulative voting, since the
justification of empowering shareholders is not as availing in those
cases.51
2) California’s approach
California, in considering amendments concerning majority
voting, had to also take into account the effect of majority voting on
cumulative voting, as California mandates cumulative voting for firms
incorporated in California (but then provides an exemption to all firms
listed on a national exchange).52 The effect of majority voting on
cumulative voting is subject to some debate. In California, no director
may be removed by a majority of shareholders whose votes would be
sufficient to win under cumulative voting.53 Otherwise, a majority vote
may eliminate a director who would otherwise be victorious under a
cumulative voting regime. So, if one must choose between the two
methods, the choice would depend on whether the relevant value
judgment presented is empowering all shareholders vs. the board or
empowering large shareholders vs. small shareholders. Adopting
cumulative voting for contested elections, but allowing a majority
withhold vote provision for uncontested elections may resolve the
disparity.54
A bill seeking to amend the California Corporation Code
currently awaiting the Governor’s signature, much like the MBCA,
exempts corporations with cumulative voting (and also, by implication,
corporations not listed on a national exchange).55 It only permits
shareholders to opt out of plurality voting for uncontested elections,
reaching the same result as the MBCA but by different means.56 It
originally disallowed board discretion in carrying out a director
resignation policy, but has since been amended to grant the board of
directors of corporations the authority to reappoint a rejected director if
special circumstances, as determined by the board, warrant the
retention of the director.57 In addition, the bill provides that the vote to
51

See Id. at 13.

52

1 Cal. Corp. Code § 301.5(a).

53

1 Cal. Corp. Code § 303.

54

See an exchange between Broc Romanek and a Calpers representative, posted on
www.thecorporatecounsel.net/blog/archive/2006_08.html.

55

See California Senate Bill 1207, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/.

56

Id.

57

Id.
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change the corporate bylaws to majority vote requirements for director
elections must be by vote of all outstanding shares rather than by a
majority of votes cast, a more onerous requirement than the MBCA or
Delaware’s default rule.58

3) The Grundfest proposal
Professor Grundfest has proposed tailoring SEC regulations and
listing standards to take into account a successful majority withhold
vote against a director.59 This would have the benefit of not requiring
abolition of the holdover rule to give effect to a successful campaign
against a recalcitrant board. Among many alternative strategies for his
proposal, Grundfest notes that SRO listing standards could be amended
to exclude from the definition of independent director one from whom a
majority of votes have been withheld60, or they could have their vote
unrecognized for purposes of any listing standard voting requirement.61
Furthermore, the SEC could enhance their disclosure liability, commit to
challenging indemnification of such directors, or enhance regulatory
scrutiny of filings by companies with a majority withheld director.62 For
that matter, the Chancery Court could also alter its review of decisions
by directors in which a majority withhold vote has been successful.63
Grundfest would temper his approach with a 90 day delay of the
effective date and a cure mechanism using shareholder consents to
allow the board an opportunity to respond to a successful withhold
campaign without penalty.64 This approach would enhance the
negotiating leverage for financial intermediaries that are able to institute

58

Id.

59

Grundfest, Joseph A., Advice and Consent: An alternative Mechanism for
Shareholder Participation in the Nomination and Election of Corporate Directors. In
Lucian Bebchuk, ed., Shareholder Access to the Corporate Ballot (Harvard University
Press, 2004).

60

Id. at 10.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id. at 12. For instance, decisions of special litigation committees are afforded
discretion under business judgment review. Upon proper pleading, they can be
examined under “entire fairness review”. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (1984).

64

Id. Grundfest also notes that allowing cures by shareholder consent could allow the
regulatory body to designate replacements as tainted by the withhold vote as well, thus
keeping the board from using its power to replace to minimize the effect of Grundfest’s
proposal.
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successful campaigns, without entirely halting a board’s ability to
function.65
4) An International Perspective
For European Companies, majority voting is the default method for
electing directors in both contested and uncontested elections, with
some rare exceptions.66 Japan uses a supermajority voting requirement
to oust directors.67 Proponents of majority voting use examples from
corporate elections in Europe and Japan to counter arguments that the
collateral damages of majority voting makes it inherently too risky
(failed elections, etc.).68 Critics might counter that the numerous other
governance differences between the United States and Europe/Japan
strain a meaningful comparison.69
III. The Shareholder Power Debate, A Foucault Pendulum
A. The General Debate
Berle and Means were the first noble souls to develop the story
of corporate development in the 19th century.70 They argued that the
development of capital intensive operations of the industrial revolution
65

ISS Report, supra, at 10.

66

Around the World in Sixty Minutes, An overview of international Corporate
Governance Trends, Institutional Investor Services, October 21, 2005, page 5.
Available at
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/GlobalCorporateGovernancePerspectivesSD.pdf.

67

Id. at 16.

68

ISS Report, supra, at 13.

69

For more information on those differences, See generally Klaus J. Hopt, Labor
Representation on Corporate Boards: Impacts and Problems for Corporate Governance
and Economic Integration in Europe, 14 INT’L L REV. L.& ECON. 203 (1994).
70

See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) AT 6. The Berle Means theory of corporate history is
far from universally accepted. For instance, Werner argues that the ownership/control
dichotomy preceded the industrial revolution. Walter Werner, Corporation Law in
Search of its Future, 81 COLUM L. REV. 1611, 1612 (1981). Mark Roe also presents a
more nuanced explanation of how market segmentation resulted from interested groups
exercising political influence in favor of financial disintermediation. See Mark J. Roe,
Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance
44 (1994). However, we will stick with Berle and Means for the time being as a useful
model. In much the way that Einsteinian relativity and quantum physics did not replace
Newtonian mechanics so much as show circumstances in which it was unable to
describe the world, leaving Newtonian mechanics to still describe most conventional
physical phenemona, the Berle Means theory of corporate history is still a useful
explanation despite the various alternate versions of economic history that it inspired.
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required larger capital inflows than any individual could provide. That,
combined with an interest in diversification, resulted in a fragmentation
of share ownership and a resulting divergence between ownership and
control in the modern corporate organism.
Fama & Jensen’s model of agency conflict informs a discussion
of the relationship between a board of directors and its shareholders in
describing how the separation of ownership from control can
complicate matters in the modern Berle-Means corporation.71 Jensen
described that relationship as one in which principals engage agents to
perform a service which entails delegation of authority. If both parties
to the relationship are utility-maximizers, many situations may arise in
which the agents interest will diverge from that of the principal.
Principals would then expend to create incentives for agents to limit
aberrant activities, and agents would frequently expend bonding costs
to ensure principal interest and maintain a profitable relationship. But if
agents can take advantage of information asymmetries to engage in
profitable aberration at the principals’ expense and without the
principals’ knowledge, it may be rational for them to do so.72
In steps corporate law fiduciary duties to relieve the conflict, but
corporate law is fairly deferential to board decisions. The shareholder
franchise serves as the justification for this deference of authority given
to the board of directors in the form of the business judgment rule and
the demand requirement for derivative litigation.73 In essence, the
argument goes, “you elected them, now let them do their jobs, and if
you don’t like it, replace them.”74 The threat of being able to replace
directors should mean that shareholders will be in a better position to
negotiate for change, and directors will have added incentive to avoid
71

Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L.
& ECON. 301 (1983).
72

Berle and Means, supra, at 6.

73

A key element of the corporate structure is the shareholder franchise-- shareholders'
power to elect and replace directors. Corporate statutes provide shareholders with this
power, which courts view as a fundamental element of the corporate structure. Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833,
851 (January 2005), citing Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch.
1988) (noting the "central importance of the franchise to the scheme of corporate
governance"); See also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A3d 946 (Del. 1985).
74

Some argue that shareholder supremacy fails to take into account stakeholders, such
as employees or creditors, who deserve a say in corporate decision-making. The U.S.
model provides for shareholder supremacy, as shareholders are the only group with a
fixed and permanent interest in the underlying assets of the corporation. Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 66-72
(1991). I will leave the shareholder v. stakeholder debate to other fora for now and
focus on the shareholder v. manager conflict, with the debatable assumption that the
U.S. shareholder supremacy model is superior.
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results that will induce shareholders to initiate a campaign to replace
them.75
The field of corporate law is awash in battles over whether or not
shareholder control is largely a myth perpetrated by those who stand to
benefit by board entrenchment.76
Recent evidence compiled by
Professor Bebchuk indicates that the balance of power in corporate
elections has, over the last 10 years, run markedly in favor of boards.77
But corporate law traditionalists argue that the case for increasing
shareholder power is inherently flawed.78 They urge that the internal
inconsistency of shareholder’s commitment to a company and the
inconsistent goals of different shareholders make it extremely difficult
for corporate law to make shareholders absolutely prime, even if that is
the outcome favored.79 The question arises: which type of shareholder
matters more?80 The day trader, or the pensioner; the institutional
investor, or the small investor?81 The time horizon and the character of
the investor determine the ability of corporate lawmakers and
chancellors to encourage the shareholder primacy model.82 The
different interests of shareholders makes it difficult for corporate
policymakers to engineer legal regimes in such a way as to determine
which type of shareholder the board member should serve. This
describes the difficulty in determining whether shareholder primacy
goals are attainable without even going into the non-financial goals that
75

Also observed in Stephen Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting
Rights 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, at 614 (February 2006).

76

Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law 95 (1986) (noting cynic’s view that “the whole
institution of shareholder voting is a fraud”); See also Stout, Lynn The Mythical
benefits of Shareholder Control working paper; See also Stephen Bainbridge, Director
Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, *1736 (2006);
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784
(April 2006).
77
Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833 (January 2005).
78

“Far from the single owner of a building, the shareholders are a diverse and evershifting group of people and institutions, with differing interests and, in the case of
institutional investors, differing obligations to their own diverse constituencies.”
Martin Lipton and Steven Rosenblum, Election Contests on the Corporate proxy, An
Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67, *68, (November 2003). A logical
observation; but also a consistent one, coming from the inventor of the poison pill.
79

“Shareholders with private interests, however, might prefer the firm to pursue those
interests at the expense of the interests they have in common with other shareholders.”,
Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 561, *575 (February 2006).
80

Id..

81

Also observed by Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Voting Rights, supra, at 634.

82

Lipton, supra,at 74
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shareholders may have. Corporate Pensions investing in the companies
that employ their membership are one example. Those shareholders
potentially have an interest in full employment that could conflict with
the wealth maximization goals of other shareholders.83
Socially
responsible investors who seek policy changes like divestment present
another interesting problem.84
The corporate law traditionalists85 urge that a corporation is
merely a “nexus of contracts”86, and shareholders deserve no more than
the benefit of the contracts they are able to negotiate.87 If one should
leave it up to shareholders to express dissatisfaction with their share
performance by taking the “Wall Street Walk,”88 access to capital
markets may be sufficient to discipline managerial shirking or selfdealing. If one assumes semi-strong market efficiency, shareholders
should be looking out for their own interests already without the need
for corporate law by simply determining who they invest in.89
Reputation costs in the capital market should be the controlling force
that keeps management focused on the interests of shareholders.
Another interesting dimension to the shareholder democracy debate is
whether one share, one vote is the even the right allocation of voting
rights.90 For instance, warrant and option holders, who have an

83

Bainbridge, supra, at 609, citing Morris M. Kleiner & Marvin L. Bouillon, Providing
Business Information to Production Workers: Correlates of Compensation and
Profitability, 41 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 605, 614-15 (1988)
84

Continuing that line of analysis, one might ask what about shareholders that have
moderate risk preferences, versus high risk preferences? Also, conflicts may directly
arise between shareholders that implicate anti-competitive practices. Would a large
hedge fund that owns an interest in each of two competing companies make voting
decisions that would work to erode value for other shareholders?

85

For an effective summary of the traditionalist view, see Leo Strine, Toward a True
Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving
Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, *1762 (April 2006).

86

Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).

87

Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1416 (1989); But compare Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs,
and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985)
88

Selling your shares, also known as the “Wall Street Rule”, explored in further detail
in Bainbridge, supra, at 619.

89

There is a substantial literature regarding bounded rationality, beyond the scope of
this article, which calls into question the rational choices of economic actors. See
generally John Conlisk Why Bounded Rationality? 34 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC
LITERATURE 669 (June 1996).
90

See generally Shaun Martin and Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, U. ILL. L. REV.,
(2005).
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expected interest somewhat similar to plain vanilla shareholders, get no
voting rights.91
The pro-management side of the argument continues that
corporate law will not be nearly as effective at setting up a shareholder
primacy regime, in that it’s efficiency would lag behind that of an
information market such as the securities market.92 Some argue that
what it can provide is a regime that mandates accurate disclosure to
make this market more efficient, as the securities laws do, but it cannot
be an effective instrument to force companies to put shareholders first.93
Traditionalists also cite what is essentially an “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix
it” argument that the U.S. financial markets perform well in comparison
to other countries, so corporate governance and board primacy cannot
be all that bad.94 It’s a simple and effective system, according to its
adherents. But not everyone agrees that the Wall Street Rule is a
congent justification for a lack of real shareholder democracy. For one,
large investor’s need to diversify means they can’t sell off their whole
portfolio. Further, too much buying and selling leads to tax and fee
consequences that will diminish returns for investors. What is more,
institutions selling out to express dissatisfaction will itself diminish the
share value for other investors, leading to a sort of downward spiral
effect.95 And while they can diversify against individual corporate
operational risk, finding a way to minimize operational risk (from
shirking and self-dealing) systematically might well be worth the cost of
changing the balance of power, according to advocates of the
shareholder democracy movement. Shareholder rights advocates urge
that it’s worth giving it a shot, as we have never have given institutions
a chance to oversee management. How do we know if a refined
shareholder franchise doesn’t earn a premium through encouraging
more effective governance if we never try?
91

Id. This analysis can get quite complicated. For instance, a shareholder who also
sells shares short is betting against the enterprise but still gets to vote in elections
controlling its future.

92

Bainbridge, supra, at 627.

93

They effectively argue that all we can do is require disclosure of financial data and
other information, leave ultimate power and discretion in the hands of managers, and
allow the capital markets to reward managers if shareholders like what the managers
are doing.

94

Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1735, *1739 (April 2006)(“Despite the alleged flaws in its governance
system, the U.S. economy has performed very well, both on an absolute basis and
particularly relative to other countries.”). This argument, however, is the least
convincing proposed by traditionalist apologists. The question remains: Under an
optimal governance regime, how much better would our markets perform?
95

Furthermore, index investors, an increasingly popular asset class, are stuck as they do
not sell shares based on idiosyncratic characteristics of the stock.
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Bebchuk offers evidence that management typically ignores
precatory proposals to eliminate staggered boards.96 Bebchuk, Coates,
and Subramanian aptly note that staggered boards serve as an effective
sandbar against any wave of shareholder reform.97 Critics would use
this as evidence that changing election defaults is a useless endeavor. It
is nevertheless uncertain whether this is an indictment of the argument
of board accountability, or merely a reflection of a lack of board
accountability.98 At present, about half of companies have staggered
boards, so perhaps reform activity can be effective at those companies
notwithstanding. Bebchuk argues that shareholders should be able to
decide the balance of power they favor.99 In effect, he would let the
shareholder decide, through adopting bylaws that control the balance of
power, where their preference sits in the shareholder power debate. It’s
an effective resolution, as most of the arguments in favor of
management discretion rest on assumptions about preferences for
capital owners, efficiencies that work to the benefit of capital owners,
and freedom of contract. Perhaps the power to adopt bylaws that
change Bebchuk’s rules of the game100 is a way of minimizing the
adhesive contract that purchasing a share is currently and would,
effectively, make the contract bargaining process more balanced.101
Now we’ve come around full circle to see that the majority
voting amendment comports with Bebchuk’s challenge to resolve the
debate by allowing shareholders to initiate rules of the game changes
into the corporate bylaws. The majority voting provision initiated by
Delaware will not end the tug of war between management and
96

“The evidence put forward below shows that management often elects not to initiate
rules-of-the-game decisions for which shareholders register strong support in precatory
resolutions.” Bebchuk, supra, at 852.

97

See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54
STAN. L. REV. 887, 925-39 (2002). Indeed, companies failing to accommodate the
precatory proposals, as members of staggered boards, would be difficult to replace in
response to their refusal to eliminate the staggered board under the precatory proposal.
98

In other words, do shareholders fail to hold directors to the carpet because they are
disinterested due to cost inefficiencies, or because they are unable due to staggered
directorships?

99

See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv.
L. Rev. 833 (January 2005).
100
101

Id. at 844

It might be that some firms would see shareholder adoption of pro-management
bylaws, others wouldn’t. Policy makers would also be able to then regress the
performance of the different allocations of authority, something we haven’t previously
been able to study. Perhaps the difference in whether such a bylaw passes would
depend in part on earning performance preceding the election, and would only target
perennial under-performers.
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shareholders that has picked up speed over the last 30 years. This
debate is bound to continue well into the 21st century. But the effect of
this majority voting accommodation will interact with other elements of
corporate governance policy in as yet unforeseen ways, and will likely
have a more powerful effect on the balance of power between boards
and shareholders than is presently understood. On the other hand, the
effectiveness of majority voting will depend, as we shall see, on the
ability of firms to outflank majority voting amendments with various
evasive tactics still available. But before exploring that further, we
should get a firmer grasp of the present economic incentives facing the
shareholders who would make use of the power of majority voting.
B. Institutional Investors and the Collective Action Problem; Why no one
volunteers for Kitchen Patrol in Mutual Fund Families.
Institutional Investors own a significant percentage of equity
outstanding in U.S. markets.102 However, their ability to influence
corporate decision making is minimized by the effect of securities
laws,103 conflicts of interest,104 and economic cost phenemona.105
Activism was also classically constrained by the free rider problem.106
Historically, institutional investors used their power in two ways:
“jawboning” management in negotiations and presenting a shareholder
governance proposal at an annual meeting.107 Institutions would
typically target a small number of underperforming firms to make
102

See, e.g., Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Perspective on Shareholder Nominations of
Corporate Directors, 59 BUS. LAW 95, 95 n.2 (2003) (institutional investors held 55.8%
of publicly traded equities in the United States in 2001).
103

See Bainbridge Limited Voting, supra, at 618.

104

(“Those institutions most inclined to be activist investors are associated with state
governments and labor unions, and often appear to be driven by concerns other than a
desire to increase the economic performance of the companies in which they invest. By
contrast, those institutional investors one might think are best situated to make wise
voting decisions--the money managers who operate mutual funds, particularly index
funds--have little desire to spend money on stockholder activism or offend corporate
management.”) See Strine, supra, at *1765; See also Brickley, J.A., Lease, R.C. and
Smith, C.W., 1988, Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments,

Journal of Financial Economics 20: 267-292.
105

Coffee, J.C., Jr., Liquidity versus control: The institutional investor as corporate
monitor. Columbia Law Review 91: 1277-1368; See also footnote from Grundfest, Just
Vote No, supra.
106

Even the most activist institutions spend less than less than half a basis point of
assets under management (.005%) per year on their governance efforts (Del Guercio
and Hawkins 1997). Black, infra, at 5.

107

Black, Bernard. Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United
States; published in Peter Newman, ed., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
and the Law (1998), page 2.
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examples of them.108 Merely voting no is certainly less costly than
submitting an alternate slate of directors. Withold vote campaigns were
more of a remote-control sort of activism.
Numerous academics (notably: Grundfest, Rock, and Black, among
others) have modeled investor rationality using Equation (A) to describe
where it becomes economically rational for an investor to undertake
action109 using variants of the following equation:
(A) ci < pi * xi * Bi
where,
ci = shareholder i's expected cost of participation;
pi = shareholder i's estimate of the probability that her decision to
participate will result in successful collective action with benefits Bi ;
xi = the percentage of the corporation's shares owned by shareholder
i; and
Bi = shareholder i's estimate of the aggregate net benefits to all
shareholders that will result from successful collective action.
This equation states that a profit-maximizing shareholder will agree
to bear the private costs of participation, ci, only when those costs are
less than the anticipated benefits to that individual shareholder, xiBi,
weighted by the estimated probability, pi, that the shareholder's
participation in the initiative will contribute to generating those
benefits.110
This simple equation described why mutual funds and other
institutional investors weren’t more active in calling for change.
Institutional activism is picking up speed, however, in both majority
voting and calls for a shareholder nomination capability. Granted,
withhold votes are still an inexpensive means to call for change as
108

Black, Bernard supra “For example, CalPERS, the largest state pension plan and the
Council iof Institutional Investors annually identify a handful of poorly performing
firms as targets for governance initiatives. This lets a proposal serves double duty: as a
way to improve governance procedures and as a signal of investor displeasure with
management.”

109

This equation and its explanation in the paragraph that follows it is drawn from
Grundfest, Joseph, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians
Inside the Gates 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, *910 (1993); citing Bernard S. Black,
Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, at 575-91 (1989); Edward
B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism,
79 GEO. L.J. 445, 453-63 (1991).
110

Id, Grundfest further explains: “This last variable, pi, incorporates (1) each
shareholder's ex ante estimate that the process as a whole will overcome the collective
action problems described above, as well as (2) the shareholder's subjective assessment
of the extent to which her participation in the process contributes to reaching the final
outcome.”
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before, it’s just that the law is changing to give this inexpensive form of
activism legal consequence. But, assuming the rationality model is still
valid, there may be more that we can add to the rationality equation. At
present, I would posit that a handful of phenomena uniquely alter the
calculus of investor rationality and explain part of the reason for this
change from the status quo.
First, the expected rapid decrease in the cost of proxy solicitation111
due to the SEC’s move for online proxy availability makes the variable ci
significantly lower than before. The elimination of broker voting112 will
also make shareholder initiatives more likely to succeed by decreasing
the number of votes necessary to achieve success, thus increasing the
variable pi.
Additionally, the development of information
intermediaries, such as ISS and Glass Lewis, Inc., that specialize in
compiling data and quantifying and rating the corporate governance
function of companies, and then use that information to advise
institutions how to vote their proxy, dramatically decrease the cost of
collaboration in a proxy campaign and also work to increase the odds of
its success.113
Additionally, we must add activist hedge funds into the calculus.114
Hedge funds run over 1.5 trillion dollars, and investors in hedge funds
count on their managers for active management to increase alpha
(returns). Hedge funds earn a percentage of their fund returns and a
management fee based on the size of funds under management. One
strategy that hedge funds use to achieve returns is instituting
shareholder activist activity. After taking a significant position in an
underperforming company, it may agitate for corporate policy changes
through threatening to lead a proxy fight or threatening litigation by
using rights afforded shareholders.115 Recognizing legal consequence
for withhold vote campaigns adds another tool to their arsenal. Whether
this works to the benefit of other shareholders is legitimately debated.116
111

See Section infra on online proxy solicitation.

112

See Section infra on the NYSE’s amendment to Rule 452.

113

See Strine, supra, at 1765 “For that reason, many rely heavily on the advice of yet
another level of agency, firms like Institutional Investor Services (ISS) that provide
advice on how to vote on corporate ballot issues, to satisfy their legal obligation to vote
in an informed manner on behalf of their investors.”
114

Bainbridge also observes that hedge funds are a new exception to the rarity of
institutionally funded proxy fights. See Bainbridge, supra, at 630.

115

E.g., 220 actions, shareholder derivative suits, appraisal rights, seek injunctions of
corporate merger activity, etc. The potential for such annoyance could make it
economically rational for the board to pay the fund to go away by, say, buying back the
fund’s shares at a premium.

116

For an exploration of some of the disturbing implications of empty voting, where
hedge funds purchasing the right to vote other owners shares may result in an incentive
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Some say they are reminiscent of the greenmailers of the 80s, while
others argue that they can effectively overcome the shareholder
collective action problem and inure benefits for their fellow
shareholders.117
A rational activist fund would include the expected returns of future
inflows of investment that might result from a successful campaign to
alter management policies through a withhold vote or proxy fight.
Proxy fights are always heavily covered in the business press, and
raising funds from even sophisticated investors is inherently a sales
game. So a sensible fund would include the value of that good P.R. in
its calculus. We might model it this way:
(B) ci < pi * xi * Bi + pii * Rii
Where
pii = The expected probability of the proxy campaign’s overall
success.
Rii = The expected present value of future benefits to activist hedge
fund ii in the form of management fees and performance fees earned
in the future on an influx of future capital due to the favorable
signals to hedge fund investors that the fund initiating the campaign
has a distinct advantage in increasing returns through activism.

to vote in a way that actually harms the firm, see Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black,
Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and
Reforms, 61 BUS. LAW. 1011, (May 2006). Hedge fund participation in withhold vote
campaigns using borrowed shares could mean that this shareholder democracy
movement could be hijacked by market players with perverse incentives, as in the case
of a fund with a leveraged short position in a firm that bought voting rights in that firm.
Whether hedge fund participation in the shareholder democracy movement will
collaborative or parasitic remains to be seen. This concern was also recently relayed by
SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins in a speech before the 2007 Corporate Directors’
Forum. Available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch012207psa.htm#10.
117

See the share buyback programs initiated at Imclone and AOL Time Warner as a
result of Carl Icahn’s activism at those firms. In a share buyback, a company will buy
shares and convert them to treasury holdings, which has the effect of increasing the per
share price of all shares outstanding as the total market value is divided over a lower
number of shares. This method may be preferred over a simple dividend due to income
tax efficiency. Whether this works to the benefit of other shareholders would depend
on whether the time horizon of the fund, typically very short, meches well with the
other shareholders. For instance, some shareholders may prefer that more money be
invested in research and development for future appreciation in share value because the
firm has a distinct advantage in some area over the long term. Other shareholders may
want appreciation immediately.
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Ri might look something like the standard equation for
discounting future cash flows:
Ri = Qt=0 FVt / (1+d)t

Or, put more simply, the sum of future cash flows over the
applicable period. Those cash flows would come as a percentage of the
influx of future capital in the form of a management fee and would
include a percentage of the performance fee on the amount by which the
fund presumed it could make the capital influx grow.
Activist hedge funds would use Equation (B) in ascertaining
whether or not a proxy fight was worth their while. Additionally,
though it would be difficult to quantify, we might analogize that union
and private pension fund investors may also obtain some private
benefit, either for political advantage for the appointed board or future
membership drives in a union, that would make activism more
profitable for them than it would be for, say, a mutual fund whose
investors are more passive.118 Making hedge fund especially relevant to
this discussion is the fact that the institutions that traditionally served as
active intermediaries, such as Calpers, are increasingly investing in
activist hedge funds.119
IV. The Shareholder Power Debate as Applied to Majority Voting
A. General Arguments
In the context of withhold votes, some argue this will decrease
incentives for eligible directors to want to serve, would turn usually
collegial board activity divisive, or would distract board members from
more productive activity.120 Of course, every change in corporate
governance that works against the discretion and the financial security
of management is hailed as yet another factor diminishing the pool of
talent willing to serve on boards of directors. The response would be
that either you’re dealing with prestige seekers, who we’re not worried
about anyway because how could that conflict with the interest of the
company; Or, we’re dealing with people who want money, in which
118

Romano explores institutional shareholder conflicts of interest in more detail. See
Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable
Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE. J. ON REG. 174, 177 (2001).

119
120

E.g., One of activist hedge fund Shamrock Holdings’ largest investors is Calpers.

See Strine, supra, at 1768 “Due to her knowledge of how corporate boards work, the
traditionalist has little interest in initiatives that single out specific board members for
defeat or embarrassment. She knows boards almost always work by consensus and it is
therefore silly to hold a solitary director responsible for a company's poor performance
or lack of responsiveness to shareholder interests”.
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case just increase board compensation. This is not nearly as convincing
an argument in this context as it is in discussing increases in director
liability. The embarrassment of a withhold vote pales in comparison to
the obligations directors face in the wake of Disney121 and SarbanesOxley. The marginal disincentive against serving on boards presented
by the prospect of a withhold vote campaign would be minimal.
The argument has also been raised that giving the power to
eliminate directors through a withhold vote campaign would make
directors prey to the self interested desires of groups, like labor unions
and public pensions, whose interests may run counter to the larger
Directors would be risk-adverse, the
group of shareholders.122
argument runs, and would fold in negotiations with these groups in the
event a withhold vote was threatened.123 However, this presumes that
the threat was credible. Would a Board give credence to the threat of a
union shareholder to institute a withhold vote campaign if the Board
didn’t enhance its retention policies? Fidelity and Calpers would prove
more difficult to convince in such a campaign than the buildup to
shareholder dissatisfaction with Michael Eisner.
Thus when
shareholders have reasons that don’t comport with benefits to share
value, the other sophisticated shareholder would presumably side with
management in the campaign. The only exception may be that unions
and public pensions might use their clout for private benefit in
companies where a withhold vote would be salient for other reasons.124
Yet another argument against giving legal effect to withhold
votes is that it would actually have the unintended effect of making
them less likely. The same group that originally argued against
withhold votes as damaging director reputations now asserts that
symbolic withhold votes are a positive force in governance, but only
when they remain symbolic. Institutions may be less likely to institute
them if it has powerful and concrete effects on the firm in which they
are invested. This is clearly a complicated quantitative question, one we
will probably not know that answer to until more time has passed.
Interestingly, ISS doesn’t see this as an issue.125
B. A First Strike Capability for financial intermediaries
121

In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. Sup. 2006).

122 See Saunders, Robert. “Why Majority Voting in Director Elections is a Bad Idea,”
1 Virginia Law & Business Review 107 (2006).
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Id. at 122.
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For example, if an employee’s union had agreed not the go along with the withhold
vote against Eisner, in exchange for concessions on employee bargaining, but such
collusion would be possible without the specter of a voting challenge.

125

ISS Report, supra, at 16.

26

Pandora’s Ballot Box, or a Proxy with Moxie?

Critics assert that, should a withhold vote be successful against a
number of directors, then the ability of the board to function could be
constrained.126 Institutional shareholder claim that, far from killing the
golden goose, they only want an opportunity to single out individual
directors and hope to negotiate in advance of the specter of a withhold
vote campaign.127 But, even if the holdover rule were abolished and
withhold vote wars could create such chaos, would the ability to
threaten such an outcome be without precedent? And if such
brinkmanship is a legitimate tool of corporate power negotiations, why
not give some such power to institutional investors? If a withhold vote
could eliminate the independent members of a board, thus making the
board non-compliant with independence rules and unable to create
independent committees, then institutional investors would be vested
with the same form of scorched-earth tactic that case law has blessed in
the poison pill.128 Though there would be no fiduciary check on such a
power, we might expect some form of détente in this nuclear arms race.
126

For instance, it may be unable to achieve a quorum to conduct business; it could
constitute a breach of an executive candidate’s employment agreement resulting in a
trigger of severance payments; it could result in a "change of control” under corporate
credit agreements resulting in accelerating debt or canceling a line of credit, or
triggering changes in licenses, franchise agreements or other important corporate
arrangements, or if a fixed number of directors is to be elected by holders of one class
of securities, a failure to elect one or more directors could alter the relationship among
shareholders of different classes, or the company’s ability to comply with stock
exchange listing standards or other requirements for maintaining independent directors
or directors with particular qualifications may be inhibited, or the failure to elect one or
more candidates may alter the consequences of having a staggered or classified board,
and finally a dissident group with minority representation on the board of directors
could enlarge its percentage of directors if new nominees to the board are not elected -thereby avoiding the need for a direct proxy contest challenge and altering the existing
dynamics of control contests. COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS DISCUSSION
PAPER 1506 PLI/Corp 473, *481

127

The President of the United Airlines Pilots Union claimed “We don’t want to kill the
golden goose, just choke it by the neck until it give us every last egg” Roger
Lowenstein, “Into Thin Air”, New York Times, Feb. 17, 2002, § 6 at 40.

128

Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1353 (Del. 1985) (“Having
concluded that sufficient authority for the Rights Plan exists in 8 Del.C. § 157, we note
the inherent powers of the Board conferred by 8 Del.C. § 141(a), n11 concerning the
management of the corporation's "business and affairs" also provides the Board
additional authority upon which to enact the Rights Plan.”); Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum
Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 953-954 (Del. 1985)(“The board has a large reservoir of authority
upon which to draw. Its duties and responsibilities proceed from the inherent powers
conferred by 8 Del.C. § 141(a), respecting management of the corporation's "business
and affairs". n6 Additionally, the powers here being exercised derive from 8 Del.C. §
160(a), conferring broad authority upon a corporation to deal in its own stock. From
this it is now well established that in the acquisition of its shares a Delaware
corporation may deal selectively with its stockholders, provided the directors have not
acted out of a sole or primary purpose to entrench themselves in office.”) ; Maldonado
v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1255 (Del. Ch. 1980) rev’d on other grounds.
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After all, the threat would only be salient in the event that it appeared
likely a majority of shareholders voting in the election would go along,
and turnout would seemingly be higher if the prospect of such
consequences were present. The traditionalist’s ready response would
be that the scorched earth tactic embodied in the poison pill is permitted
only for a discrete case, the change of control transaction, which is
especially subject to a risk of erosion of shareholder value. Thus, it
hardly justifies expansion of that form of power into the hands of
institutional and activist investors for general use. This diversion is
entirely academic at this point, as the holdover rule would function (as a
sort of missile defense) to ultimately protect against nearly all of the
enumerated fallout. However, in the event that alterations to the
holdover rule enter the agenda this analysis should be revisited.
Critics of institutional investor activism generally also cite concerns
over the growth of influence wielded by ISS and other proxy solicitation
firms.129 Corporate law traditionalists also posit that institutions and
proxy advisory services are not constrained by the strictures of fiduciary
duty jurisprudence and are more short term oriented than corporate
managers, thus they can’t be trusted to wield corporate power as
responsibly.130 One response might be that alternative directors put
forth by the institutions in proxy fights would also be held to the same
responsibilities, or that such analysis flips fiduciary duty on its
side…shareholders were never meant to bear fiduciary burdens, and
can be trusted to make decisions about bylaws and elections outside of
the change-of-control context that serve the interests of all shareholders.
We need not resolve the debate here, however. My objective is merely
to set the stage for withhold votes to enter the fray. But first, we should
examine some initiatives that other regulatory agencies have been
exploring in 2006 that will have a profound effect on majority voting.
V. Brewing a Perfect Storm---SEC proxy reform, NYSE Exchange Rule
452, and Internet Proxy Solicitation.
A. A Modest Proposal
In 2003, The Securities Exchange Commission considered a rule to
allow shareholders to include nominees on the corporate ballot upon
129
130

See Strine, supra, at 1765.

Strine, supra, at “Unlike corporate managers, neither institutional investors as
stockholders nor ISS as a voting advisor owe fiduciary duties to the corporations whose
policies they seek to influence. And unlike the individual investors whose capital they
use to wield influence, institutional investors and their advisors bear far less of the
residual risk of poor voting decisions, as their compensation turns more on short-term
factors than on long-run growth.”
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the occurrence of certain triggering events.131 This is extremely
important, as companies typically vote on behalf of shareholders who
are unable to attend the annual meeting, and solicit the proxies of those
shareholders in order to do so. A proxy statement must be delivered to
shareholders in connection with that solicitation which will describe the
issues and proposals up for vote.132 As a company uses its resources to
pay the cost of these proxy solicitations, which can be prohibitive,
getting one’s proposal onto the corporate proxy is vital.133 However, a
company may exclude a shareholder proposal if it relates to an election
or falls under other criterion enumerated by the SEC.134 Recently, the
SEC has initiated a process to revisit its interpretation of the election
exclusion in response to AFSCME v. AIG, in which the Second Circuit
held that a shareholder bylaw proposing a method for including
shareholder nominees on the corporate ballot in future elections did not
relate to “an election”, as the SEC held in a letter ruling, but related to
the election process in general, and thus could not be properly excluded
from the corporate proxy.135
Additionally, the SEC instituted a proposal to explicitly allow
shareholder nominations to the corporate ballot under a new Rule 14a11 in 2003, which has since stalled in the review process.136 The
proposed rule would have required companies to include between one
and three nominees of holders of at least 5% of all outstanding shares
(for 2 years) if one of two triggers applied : i)at least 35% of shareholders
previously withheld support for a board nominee or ii)a majority of
shareholders voted to be governed by14a-11.137
Shareholder bylaws regarding nominations would still need to be
legal under state corporation law. The Delaware legislature seems to
131

SEC Release Nos. 34-48626 (Oct. 14, 2003).
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Exchange Act Rule 14a-3(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (2004).
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McDonnell, Brett, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills,
3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205, *211 (December 2005).
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This includes proposals that relate to an election, are improper under state law, have
been substantially implemented by the company, or conflict with the company’s own
proposal on the current ballot, among other exclusions. See Exchange Act Rule 14a-8,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2004)
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American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. American Intern.
Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, *128 (2d Cir. 2006). (“Thus, we cannot agree with the
second half of the SEC's interpretation of the 1976 Statement: that a proposal may be
excluded under Rule 14a8(i)(8) if it would simply establish a process for shareholders
to wage a future election contest.”).
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See Proposed Rule 14a-11. See also Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 60,784-85; See also Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the
Nomination and Election of Directors, July 15, 2003, p. 1.

137

See proposed Rule 14a-11(a)(2)(i); 14a-11(a)(2)(ii); 14a-11(b); 14a-11(d).
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have presumptively blessed the legality of shareholder bylaws requiring
removal upon a majority withhold vote, so clearly a shareholder bylaw
will not be held illegal simply for relating to the election process for
Delaware Corporations. However, this does not guarantee that all
iterations of shareholder nomination bylaws that are included on the
corporate ballot will be enforceable under Delaware law.138
However, presuming that shareholders will manage to achieve the
holy grail of corporate ballot access through one of these two SEC
venues, either through SEC action under 14a-11 that will restrict
corporate discretion to exclude shareholder nominees, or under a
shareholder approved bylaw that survives the scrutiny of the Delaware
courts, the withhold vote bylaw will interact with nominations to
potentially flip the empowerment debate on its side. In the event that a
company’s board became host to an insurgent nominee, that managed
to win by a mere plurality, the company could use a withhold vote
campaign to remove that director from its board in a successive election.
Management would effectively be able to institute a withhold vote
campaign against insurgent directors elected by a plurality vote in a
contested election, but whose motives seem suspect to a majority of
shareholders voting in a subsequent election.
Conversely, an institutional investor could potentially overcome the
holdover rule by a combination withhold vote/insurgent nominee
campaign over two successive annual meetings. The withhold vote
campaign is muted by the phenemona were a director may lose a
majority, but maintain his seat until a new director can be elected.
Since, absent a shareholder access rule or bylaw, the replacement
nominee will usually be hand picked by the board, the director would
always be replaced with a board nominee. However, if institutional
investors are able to win a withhold vote, and then place a nominee on
the corporate ballot at the next election, the power of the withhold vote
bylaw would then be enhanced.
C. Rule 452
In addition to SEC regulation of the proxy solicitation process, the
NYSE regulates proxy voting through rules defining when a broker who
holds a share on behalf of his client (in “street name”) may vote that
client’s shares.139 Brokers are permitted to vote in the absence of
directions from the client in the event that the matter is considered

138

Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and ShareholderAdopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 546 (1997).
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See NYSE Rule 452.
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routine.140 The most compelling justification for allowing brokers to
vote on behalf of clients is that attaining a quorum would be
exceedingly difficult if broker held shares went uncounted.141
Historically, Rule 452 classified uncontested elections of directors as
routine.142 However, in response to a growing use of withhold vote
campaigns and shareholder activism, the NYSE commissioned a
working group to study the issue which recommended that uncontested
elections be classified as non-routine, meaning brokers could not vote
those shares on behalf of their client in an uncontested election.143 That
recommendation is on the verge of being instituted.
The ability of brokers to vote shares held in street name has
dramatic implications for the dynamics of withhold vote campaigns, a
factor the NYSE considered in their exploration of the rule change.144 By
some estimates, 70-80% of all publicly traded shares are held in street
name.145 Brokers typically vote in favor of management re-election and
in favor of management proposals.146 For instance, if broker votes had
not been counted in the Eisner withhold vote campaign, Eisner would
have only received 45% in favor of his re-election and a majority of
140

Rule 452 states, “Voting procedure without instructions: A member organization
which has transmitted proxy soliciting material to the beneficial owner of stock or to an
investment adviser, registered either under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or
under the laws of a state, who exercises investment discretion pursuant to an advisory
contract for the beneficial owner and has been designated in writing by the beneficial
owner of such stock (hereinafter “designated investment adviser”) to receive soliciting
material in lieu of the beneficial owner and solicited voting instructions in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 451, and which has not received instructions from the
beneficial owner or from the beneficial owner’s designated investment adviser by the
date specified in the statement accompanying such material, may give or authorize the
giving of a proxy to vote such stock, provided the person in the member organization
giving or authorizing the giving of the proxy has no knowledge of any contest as to the
action to be taken at the meeting and provided such action is adequately disclosed to
stockholders and does not include authorization for a merger, consolidation or any other
matter which may affect substantially the rights or privileges of such stock.”
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See NYSE Report at 12.
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Rule 452.11(2) defines a ‘‘contest’’ as a matter that ‘‘is the subject of a countersolicitation, or is part of aproposal made by a stockholder which is being opposed by
management.”
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Report and Recommendations of the Proxy Working Group to the New York Stock
Exchange. June 5, 2006. available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/PWG_REPORT.pdf.
[hereinafter “NYSE Report”].

144

NYSE Report at 13.
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“The majority of publicly traded shares are not registered in companies’ records in
the names of the beneficial owners. Instead, an estimated 70 to 80 percent of all public
companies’ shares are held in “street name,” meaning that they are held of record by
brokers, banks or their depositories.” NYSE Report at 10.
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See NYSE Report at 14.
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votes withheld.147 The NYSE working group estimated that, in 2004
alone, elimination of street voting would have meant 32 directors of
publicly held companies would have failed to obtain a majority vote in
favor of their re-election.148 The NYSE Working Group remained
cognizant of the effect the rule change would have on the costs of
corporate elections, from increasing influence of special interest groups
to increasing the cost of campaigns due to a renewed need to increase
shareholder participation.149 However, it recommended this move as
vital to enhancing corporate accountability and the transparency of the
election process.150
C. Online Solicitation
Yet another element of securities law affecting majority voting is the
SEC’s policy shift to allow online proxy solicitation.151 The SEC
approved a proposal on December 13, 2006 to allow electronic delivery
of proxy materials by anyone soliciting proxies through a model
utilizing notice and access.152 A proxy solicitor’s obligation to furnish
proxy materials would, under that rule, be satisfied by posting them to a
website and sending a notice of their availability, details of the meeting
and proposal, and contact information for shareholders to request a
hard copy.153 Currently, the SEC only allows online furnishing of proxy
materials if the shareholder has previously consented in writing. 154 This
proposal would significantly reduce the costs of communicating with
shareholders for anyone interested in soliciting proxies of shareholders,
including management, insurgent nominees, or institutions running
withhold vote campaigns. Since corporate reimbursement of proxy
costs has traditionally worked to benefit management, the rules
proposal would alter the balance of power against management in
proxy fights or withhold vote campaigns.
D. Case in Point: The Heinz Proxy War: Would You Please Pass the Proxy?
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See NYSE Report at 9.
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See NYSE Report at 21.
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See NYSE Report at 21.
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See Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, SEC Rel. No. 34-52926 (Dec. 8, 2005)
70 Fed. Reg. 74598.
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SEC Press Release 2006-209 available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-209.htm.
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SEC Press Release.

See SEC Rel. No. 33-7233 (Oct. 6, 1995); Rel. No. 33-7288 (May 9, 1996); Rel. No.
33-7856 (Apr. 28, 2000).
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Leading up to its annual meeting in August of 2006, H.J. Heinz
was engaged in the most bitter proxy war in its history.156
Leading the charge was billionaire investor Nelson Peltz and his activist
hedge fund, Trian Investment Partners.157 Trian purchased 5.5% of
Heinz’s outstanding shares and immediately started to rattle the
saber.158 It submitted SEC filings outlining a plan to save the company
$575 million; within months Heinz management announced an
alternative plan.159
Co.155

The annual election became a referendum on the insurgent’s
plan. Five seats were up for election on the twelve member board.
Peltz offered five candidates, including himself, 3 allies and, for good
measure, former pro-golfer Greg Norman. The institutional investors
were divided: Calpers and PNC Financial announced that they would
vote for re-election of all of Heinz’s current board.160 ISS, however,
urged its institutional investor clients to accept three from Peltz’s slate
(including Norman).161 Pelz’s speech at the annual meeting was
compared to the famous Gordon Gekko diatribe in the movie Wall
Street.162 Capital Research and Associates (a large mutual fund family),
owning 13% of Heinz stock, was the likely swing vote that would carry
the day.163
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Though H.J. Heinz is not a Delaware corporation, the pertinent operation of majority
vs. plurality voting, and the process of a proxy fight, would remain the same if it were
incorporated in Delaware.
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Lisa Gewirtz, “Heinz, Anticipation Still Buzzword” The Daily Deal, August 17,
2006, also available as 2006 WLNR 14215438.
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Times, 8/17/06, 2006 WLNR 14218025.
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“When a reporter asked him if he considered his speech during the meeting "his
Gordon Gekko moment"--a reference to Michael Douglas' classic "Greed is good"
speech in the 1980s-era movie "Wall Street"--Peltz was not amused. “That doesn't
warrant a response," he said frostily. Instead, Peltz sought to emphasize that he and his
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preaches its Gospel of Truth,” Chicago Tribune, August 17, 2006, also available as
2006 WLNR 14251264. See also opening quotation, supra.
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The result: the insurgents were 2 for 5, Peltz and associate
Michael Weinstein were elected over two of the board’s candidates, and
the management slate was 3 for 5.164 At the time of the proxy fight,
Heinz had a full plurality voting regime, but in November of 2006 they
adopted majority voting for uncontested elections.165 This means that,
provided the new board members turn out to be inimical to a majority
of the institutional investors, a distinct possibility given the divisive
nature of the proxy fight, the board could institute a majority withhold
vote campaign against them. If Calpers is amenable, a board initiated
withhold vote may prove successful in ousting the Trian directors. Of
course, the holdover rule would allow the directors to remain if they
have not submitted previous resignation policies. But it is certainly
interesting that majority voting would give management an
entrenchment tool in situations such as these.
VI. Implementation of Majority Voting and Its Many Iterations
Corporations have been in a rush to implement some form of
majority voting even before the adoption of the Delaware
amendments.166 More than 120 companies had some form of majority
voting related provision, predominately in the form of director
resignation policies, as of March 2006.167 But the question is, if plurality
voting is more likely to allow management to control the election, then
what would explain the lack of resistance? Three possibilities come to
mind: i) firms want to adopt a lighter version of the majority voting
standard, and then keep shareholder versions of a similar bylaw off of
the corporate ballot under SEC Rule 14(a)(8) or simply steal the thunder
from an alternate campaign, ii) firms anticipate that majority voting
may have the converse result of helping them to fend off divisive
directors proposed under a shareholder nomination rule, if the SEC’s
ongoing exploration of this issue eventually yields results, or iii) firms
164

See Heinz Press Release, September 8, 2006, “Heinz Announces Preliminary Proxy
Voting Results; Looks Forward with Confidence to Executing Its Plans to Increase
Shareholder Value” available at http://www.heinz.com/News_f.aspx.
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Heinz Board Approves Majority Voting, Morningstar News Service, November 8,
2006, available at
http://news.morningstar.com/news/ViewNews.asp?article=/BW/20061108006002_univ
.xml&pgid=qtqnPress5.
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TAKEOVER LAW AND PRACTICE 2006 1571 PLI/Corp 259, *278 (“In June
2005, Pfizer Inc. became the first company to amend its corporate governance
guidelines to require that any director who receives a majority of withheld votes submit
his or her resignation to the board, leaving the outcome in the hands of the board. Since
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are actually interested in improving their corporate governance
apparatus in order to satisfy institutional investors.168
The question of using a policy to keep shareholder bylaws off the
ballot under Rule 14(a)(8) has been answered by the SEC in the
negative.169 However, SEC letter rulings on Rule 14, as we have seen in
AFSCME v. AIG, are not necessarily dispositive and challenges to it in
federal court could be seen in future contests. Further, an open question
also remains as to whether a majority voting bylaw adopted by the
Board, that provides wider board discretion in responding to a
successful withhold vote, would keep an alternative bylaw proposal off
the ballot.170 However, the primary advantage to having a policy
already in place is that it makes a contest to institute an alternative new
bylaw more difficult to win. During the 2006 Proxy season, 86% of
majority voting proposals, put forward where no majority voting
governance policy was currently in place, were successful.171
Alternatively, only 18% of proposals passed where a company had
previously adopted a Pfizer Governance Policy.172
A. Mechanical Issues in Tallying the Voting Outcome
The DGCL provides that “In the absence of such specification in the
certificate of incorporation or bylaws of the corporation…Directors shall
be elected by a plurality of the votes of the shares present in person or
represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the election
of directors.”173 This seemingly straightforward definition of how a vote
168

ISS has indicated that it may decline to endorse a campaign for a majority voting
bylaw in instances where a proposal has already been adopted that substantially
implemented majority voting.
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Capital One Financial Corporation, SEC Letter Opinion, 2006 WL 129325, *1
(January 16, 2006).
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the context of majority voting proposals, See Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, SEC NoAction Letter, (February 14, 2005) where a stockholder proposal for a "simple majority
vote" was properly excluded as "substantially implemented" under Rule 14a-8(i)(10)
where the registrant was engaged in the process of removing supermajority voting
provisions from its governing documents. Compare KeySpan Corporation, SEC NoAction Letter, 2006 WL 626123 (March 7, 2006).
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should be tallied, placing in the denominator the number of shares
present in person or represented by proxy and entitled to vote in the
election of directors, is subject to a surprisingly tangled web of case law
defining its application. 174 For instance, any shares present that are
entitled to vote, but do not vote in the election for some reason, would
end up increasing the number of affirmative votes necessary to elect a
director in a majority voting regime (by increasing the denominator)
and would also count as no votes (by being placed in the numerator).175
This issue becomes particularly interesting in the context of broker
street voting. Berlin v. Emerald176 outlines the various situations in
which shares are counted in the denominator and which are not in
determining voting outcomes.177 To the extent that shareholders give
their brokers directions on how to vote, even if that instruction is
precisely not to vote or to abstain, those shares are counted in the
denominator under Delaware law.178 Where voting in uncontested
elections was previously deemed discretionary by the NYSE, broker
street votes were counted in the denominator of shares entitled to vote,
even if the beneficial shareholders gave no instruction to their broker.
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Licht v. Storage Technology Corp., 2005 WL 1252355, at *1 (Del.Ch. May 6, 2005)
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So, effectively, the alteration to Rule 452179 to make voting in
uncontested elections non-discretionary will mean that not only will
there be fewer brokers voting in the affirmative for management
candidates in the numerator, but there will also be fewer votes tallied in
the total denominator. This will result in fewer withhold votes required
to achieve a majority withhold vote for withhold vote campaigns
against directors of Delaware corporations. The specter of this double
whammy effect was not mentioned in the NYSE report, and it is
uncertain whether that phenomenon was brought to their attention.180
Moderating this analysis is the fact that Delaware law merely
provides a default provision for determining voting outcomes.181
Adopting a bylaw that simplifies the process of counting votes, and
addresses the complications inherent in a majority voting situation,
would greatly simplify the question. Perhaps, in the aftermath of Rule
452 and the Delaware Amendment, boards will have a reason to explore
alternative arrangements.182
B. The Various Bylaw Strategies
1) The Pfizer Governance Policy183
Pfizer included within its governance principles (and not the
charter or bylaws) a provision that, in any uncontested election in which
a nominee receives a greater number of withhold votes than for votes
that nominee must immediately offer their resignation to the board.
Then, the Corporate Governance Committee, without participation of
the director against whom the withhold vote campaign was instituted,
will make a recommendation to the Board as to whether action is
required. The Board is then required to act within 90 days of receipt of
the recommendation.
Most companies implementing the Pfizer
approach have defined a successful withhold vote as a majority of
shares voting, rather than outstanding.184 A few, however, have used
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See Section V B supra.
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See NYSE Report. The Report mentions that elimination of affirmative broker votes
would have had a profound effect on the outcomes of majority withhold vote
campaigns. However, it stands to reason that the calculation, if it omitted the double
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the alteration to Exchange Rule 452.
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Licht at 3.

182
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Also known as the Intel strategy, as Intel was the first to adopt it.

See, e.g., Intel Corporation Bylaw Article III Section 1 available at
http://www.intel.com/intel/finance/docs/bylaws.pdf.
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the more onerous “majority of shares outstanding” approach. Over 100
companies have adopted the Pfizer Governance Policy approach.
This approach has been uniquely unpopular with institutional investors,
and would be unlikely to convince many of them against supporting an
alternative majority voting bylaw.185 However, it seems that instituting
such a policy is helpful in preventing the efficacy of a campaign to
install alternative bylaws. One relevant question would be how
Delaware case law would treat a decision to reject a director’s
nomination under a modified plurality Pfizer Plan. Most business
decisions receive business judgment review, but where a board acts for
the sole or primary purpose of perpetuating its own control, this
improper motive overrides the ordinary protection of the business
judgment rule.186 If the board’s rejection is perceived to be for such an
entrenchment purpose, and no other reason, it may be subject to
enhanced scrutiny.
2) The GE Bylaw
GE requires that any director nominee that receives more
withhold votes than affirmative votes in an uncontested election
immediately tender their resignation.187 A process is established for the
board to then consider that resignation, in similar fashion to the Pfizer
Policy. The difference is that the language of the bylaw clearly outlines
that “Absent a compelling reason for the director to remain on the
Board, the Board shall accept the resignation”.188
3) The Bebchuk Bylaw
Professor Bebchuk’s proposal, contained in General Dynamics
2006 proxy statement, is a bylaw providing that a director candidate be
ineligible to stand for election if he or she received more withheld votes
than for votes in an immediately preceding uncontested election.189
Though it failed to pass, it received a 37.9% favorable vote.190
185

Indeed, ISS has openly stated that it will push for recommend voting for an
alternative bylaw in the event that a company has adopted the Pfizer Policy approach.
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Interestingly, General Dynamics inserted an announcement of its just
adopted Pfizer Policy just below the section of its Proxy Statement
recommending a no vote on the Bebchuk bylaw.191
C. The sobering effect of the holdover rule, the staggered board, and board
replacement or resignation rejection.
The holdover rule dams the tide of horrible outcomes put forward
by the traditionalist apologists. Delaware Corporate law provides that
“Each director shall hold office until such director's successor is elected
and qualified or until such director's earlier resignation or removal.”192
The significance of this provision depends on the type of majority
provision in place. If the board or the shareholders have adopted a
bylaw requiring the removal of a director that has failed to obtain a
majority vote, then the effect of the holdover rule would be that a
director who fails to obtain such a vote in an uncontested election may
stay on as a director until a new director can be found by the board. If,
as in the GE bylaw, automatic resignation is required, then the holdover
rule is inapplicable. In the case of a Pfizer policy, the holdover rule will
be unnecessary as the Board can conceivably decide not to remove the
director. The Bebchuk Bylaw realistically takes into account the effect of
the holdover rule by only requiring a director targeted by a successful
withhold vote to stand down from running in the next successive
election.
Should Delaware at least allow the shareholders to amend the
bylaws to immediately require removal of holdover directors, in order
for 15 to apply? Some provisions in the DGCL are merely defaults that
bylaws can alter at will, some are mandatory.193 The distinction
between them is subject to a multi-factor test.194 The equal dignities rule
may, nonetheless, allow a bylaw to conflict with other provisions.195
191

See General Dynamics Proxy Statement, supra, at 39.
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Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Industries, 501 A.2d 401, *407 (Del.,1985) (“The bylaws of
a corporation are presumed to be valid, and the courts will construe the bylaws in a
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Under the so called equal dignities doctrine, “the general theory of the Delaware
General Corporation Law is that action taken under one section of that law is not
legally dependent, and its validity is not dependent upon, nor to be tested by the
requirements of other unrelated sections under which the same result might be obtained
by different means.” Orzek v. Englehart 195 A.2d 375 (Del. 1963). This has been
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Furthermore, a bylaw which interferes with what is understood to be
the traditional province of the Board will be struck down.196 The next
question is whether to make a bylaw altering the holdover rule, once
approved by the shareholders, unalterable by the Board without
shareholder approval.197
Presently it is unclear whether bylaw
provisions which purport to prohibit the board from altering or
amending them are effective.198 A board may be constrained in its
ability to unilaterally remove bylaws adopted by shareholders by
applied to bylaw amendments in Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20
(Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2000).
196

Coffee explores four dimensions that seem to indicate whether a bylaw restricting
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fiduciary duty obligations,199 but fortifying holdover alterations into the
DGCL, like the concrete provision for majority voting, would ensure
that boards would not meddle with it. An alternative approach would
be to require a replacement be found within a certain time frame, as the
MBCA offers.
Or, if you like sneaky lawyer tricks, how about simply trying the
following: if the shareholders were to adopt, in the same bylaw that
specifies the number of votes required for election, a provision that “In
the event that a director standing for an uncontested election fails to
obtain a majority of the votes cast in their favor, a written consent from
shareholders constituting 20% of the total shares voting in that election
shall be sufficient to require that director’s immediate removal” or
something similar. The iterations are limitless; the point though, is that
arguably the holdover rule repeal would be contained in a bylaw
already entrenched by the new majority voting amendment requiring
that “A bylaw amendment adopted by stockholders which specifies the
votes that shall be necessary for the election of directors shall not be
further amended or repealed by the board of directors.”200 It doesn’t say
that the bylaw amendment cannot include provisions beyond the votes
necessary provision, and it would literally read that the entire bylaw
would be unalterable.
By way of complicating this question even further, if a director
receives a majority withhold vote, and remains protected by the
holdover rule, there is no way to replace that director in the interim
between the next election if he/she is unwilling to go. The other
directors have no authority to remove a director.201 Another relevant
question will be: Who gets to replace a removed director? The default is
that a director may be replaced by a vote of a majority of the other
directors, but the firms’ charter will control the question.202 If the Board
has the authority to do so, then it may mute the effect of a successful
withhold vote. For instance, a removed Chairman could simply have
the Board appoint a director amenable to their aims if the target Board
were truly dysfunctional.
Some would argue that the presence of a staggered board would
also make majority voting less effective. As of 2005, 53% of the top 5,000
199
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U.S. Corporations by size had classified boards, meaning that the
directors are divided into groups of three and run in staggered years.203
The practical effect of this practice is that it would take two successive
elections to replace a majority of the board, thus serving as a means to
entrench the present management. The presence of a staggered board
also minimizes the effectiveness of a withhold vote campaign, as it will
mean that at most a third of the board could be removed at a time under
either a majority voting bylaw or a resignation policy. Indeed, ISS is
concerned that a negative drawback to the majority voting movement
will be a diminished willingness on the part of firms to declassify their
boards.204 If the aim of majority voting is to replace the whole board,
then staggering is an issue. However, the flip is that the presence of
staggered boards may lessen board resistance to majority voting bylaws.
E. The Strategy of the Stalking Horse Candidate205
An idea heretofore unexplored in the literature, that would
presumably be effective to halt completely the operation of a bylaw
requiring majority voting in uncontested elections, would be to
artificially create a contested election in advance of a threatened vote.
Management could enlist a dummy candidate to add to the corporate
ballot to make the number of nominees for the election exceed the
number of seats up for election. The existence of such a strategy would
mean that shareholder advocates would need to ensure an advance
resignation policy were in place in order to outflank a stalking horse
maneuver.
VII. An Analysis of Voting Outcomes Using an Analogy to Political
Science
The debate between plurality and majority voting schemes was
originally sired in the context of political representation. Analysis in
that sphere typically revolves around four distinct criterion.206 The first
factor is decisiveness, or the existence of a clear outcome at the final
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round of voting.207 The second is anonymity of voters, meaning that we
do not need to know who cast which votes to determine the outcome.208
Neutrality is a third criterion, the voting result should be such that if
everyone voted in the opposite fashion, then the other alternative would
win (a criterion which becomes particularly cogent in the event that
multiple alternatives are put forward, and the number of alternatives
presented is greater by two or more than the number of selections
permitted).209 The fourth is positive responsiveness; if alternative A is at
least tied with B, and someone then changes their vote to make it more
favorable to A( by either voting for A instead of abstaining, or by
abstaining instead of voting for B) then A wins.210
In analyzing these four criterion in the corporate context, it would
seem the anonymity criterion is least important.211 Shareholder votes
are a matter of corporate record, and the large institutional shareholders
that will have the most say in withhold vote campaigns typically are
very vocal about their interest.212 Decisiveness would be especially
important to the board of directors, an inability to elect directors would
stifle the board’s ability to act. Shareholders would share that interest,
unless one accepts the use of brinksmanship in reform negotiations (see
analysis concerning a “first strike capability” for institutional
shareholders above). I would also add cost as a fifth criterion to analyze
voting schemes for corporate elections; with fixed corporate resources
and the voters sharing the cost of incumbent management’s proxy
solicitations (though not the cost of the challenger, unless they are
victorious), shareholder voters would benefit from a cost efficient voting
method.
Majority voting is the optimal method for a choice between two
outcomes.213 However, when the alternatives extend beyond a single
binary choice, the analysis becomes increasingly complex. Some form of
plurality voting must be utilized in order to achieve the decisiveness
criterion, but the ordering of alternatives, the ordering of rounds of
voting, and the inclusion of non-viable alternatives can all be used to
game the outcome in favor of an alternative which may not be
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preferred, and in fact might otherwise be rejected, by a majority of the
voters.214 This outcome violates the positive responsiveness criterion.
Majority voting for uncontested elections of directors, as the bylaws
adopted in response the majority voting movement provide, would
enhance the ability of corporate plurality elections to achieve the four
criterion ex post (and perhaps years later) by giving voters an
opportunity to eliminate directors for which a majority of the electorate
would express a clear preference against. In effect, the ability of a
majority of shareholders to express a “withhold” or no vote against an
incumbent director would allow the voters to mop up the results that
spring from a weakness in the plurality voting scheme by eliminating
directors elected only because of a lack of alternatives or because of a
gamed process in the subsequent round of voting.
The solution that political systems in the United States have
discovered for the purposes of state wide elections is a compromise
between plurality and majority voting: the runoff election, with a
plurality election followed by a majority election for the top two vote
recipients.215 In that system, decisiveness is achieved, as you eliminate
the instance of a single candidate failing to win a majority in a race
between three or more. You also minimize gamesmanship and the
attendant risk to the neutrality criterion, as the winner of the runoff
must be ultimately selected by a majority of the electorate.
Runoff elections may be a useful addition to tools of the shareholder
democracy movement. The most significant roadblock to any reform of
the corporate election process is the additional cost of the replacement
system.216 However, the SEC’s current rule change to allow proxy
solicitation via mere postcard notice, combined with internet access to
the full proxy, should reduce the cost of contested elections for both
corporations and challengers.217 Furthermore, putting a runoff bylaw to
a shareholder vote would allow shareholders to decide if the added cost
214
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of a runoff election for directors is worth their while. Besides, it is
supposedly a rare occurrence anyway. I do not mean to suggest that
runoffs are appropriate for every company, or that this analysis is
exhaustive. However, runoffs in the context of contested corporate
elections is a concept that has thus far been wrongfully left off the table
of alternatives discussed in the shareholder democracy debate.
Some would argue that a comparison to democratic regimes is
inappropriate, as voting in the corporate context, governed as it is by
freedom of contract and transferability of rights, is simply too different
for rational comparison to other systems.218 However, I would note that
companies have used comparison to the plurality standard to justify
plurality voting.219
VIII. Conclusion and Predictions
Supporters of the majority voting amendment include a unique
cast; including SEC Chairman Cox, Ira Milstein,220 a number of Unions,
CalPERs, Professors Grundfest and Bebchuk, and former Delaware
Chief Justice Norm Veasey.221 However, the purple haze surrounding
the multi-layered reforms, recently initiated at the federal level and the
exchanges, that have affected or will affect the efficacy of withhold vote
campaigns, combined with the proximity of this change to the still
recent wave of reform flowing form Sarbanes Oxley and its regulatory
cousins, calls for a cooling off period before we stretch the analogy of
corporate democracy too far. The working parts of corporate and
securities law will interact in ways that are as yet incompletely
understood in the context of withhold votes, so perhaps we should
merely keep a keen eye on the golden goose for awhile and give the
regulatory engines a rest. In that vein, rather than advocate for a
particular alternative proposal related to the shareholder democracy
movement, or for a rollback of the reforms already instituted, or even
attempt to justify the reform movement, the conclusion of this
examination will be simply a few predictions about developments that
can be reasonably expected in the near term.
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1) It is likely that the next move is for institutional investors to rally for an
amendment to the DGCL to permit shareholders to adopt a bylaw altering the
holdover rule, and making such a rule, once adopted, similarly unalterable by
the board absent shareholder ratification.

2) Expect hedge funds to take an active role in withhold vote campaigns for
firms that have adopted such a policy, but not to take an active role in fighting
to get a strong majority voting amendment into the bylaws as that would make
board seats won in proxy contest victories more difficult to keep.
3) Expect litigation in federal courts over whether firms can exclude from the
corporate ballot under 14a8 shareholder proposals for majority voting where a
quasi-majority voting rule has already been adopted.
4) Expect attempts to institute holdover rule bylaws that result in challenges in
federal courts, or seek declaratory judgments from Delaware Chancery
Court.222
5) Expect a withhold vote campaign, in the event that one occurs in the future
in which the vote is close, to erupt into litigation over whether shares are
properly counted at “able to vote” for purposes of establishing a majority.223
6) Expect litigation over a board’s response to any successful withhold vote
campaigns, especially if its policy or ratified bylaw doesn’t provide with
specificity a board’s response to a withhold vote campaign.224
7) In the event that the shareholder access rule is revisited and is a strong as
before, look for management to institute or threaten withhold vote campaigns
against insurgency directors.225
8) Expect that these victories by the shareholder democracy movement will add
fuel to management decisions to sell out to private equity buyers that do not
present the difficulties of accountability to disparate financial intermediaries.226
9) Expect that, as institutional investors gain negotiating leverage through
victories in the shareholder democracy movement, activist hedge funds will
222
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make use of that leverage as well and their activity in that space will increase as
they are able to acquire access to more capital.
10) Expect that, as financial intermediaries power is linked to flow of capital
into their coffers, future recessions and major shifts in Federal Reserve policy
will have an effect on activist investor activity.227
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In other words, rattling the saber loses its effectiveness when your opponent knows
you can’t afford to pay for the war.

